Communications consultant
Deploying is easy. Now comes the hard part.
On 9 December the Carrier Strike Group (CSG) returned home. Flags were waved, bands played, snogging photos were taken and many articles were written (a selection below). The deployment statistics are remarkable and unless you’re part of the group that thinks the whole thing should have taken place in the channel, enough to make you very proud.
Continue reading “Bleeding out”Two recent incidents at sea have drawn unfavourable attention to the business of moving a large objects around on the water. The first was an error large enough to be visible from space and bunged up a canal that carries a significant percentage of global trade:
Continue reading “The art, science and bluff of ship handling”Now that the MV Ever Given is underway and making way there is time for a brief period of reflection as the silt settles but before the incident fades from the public eye.
Continue reading “MV Ever Given – lessons from the Suez Canal”Today’s Times Weekend published an article called Horrible Histories: The Woeful Second World War. What follows is 2800 really interesting words on the blitz, the home guard, the RAF, shelters, rationing and then a chronology of how the war unfolded. It was only when I got to the end that I realised there wasn’t a single mention of the Royal Navy. Or any navy. Or the maritime. Not one.
Continue reading “Water, water, everywhere, and yet you wouldn’t think”First published on 21 Feb 21
There has been a spate of coverage recently speculating that the current Chief of the Defence Staff’s (CDS) time-in-post is coming to an end. It has quietened down for now, and indeed the date may now have slipped until after the Integrated Review. Of one thing we can be sure, when it looks to be imminent (again), speculation as to his successor will crescendo.
Continue reading “The Chief of the Defence Staff”Author’s note. I wrote this well over a year ago when the Tornado fighter jet flew for the last time after 40 years of service. This week’s decommissioning of HMS Bristol and the dismembering of ex-HMS Berkeley, and associated outpourings of grief, reminded me that I never published.
It occurred to me during the various celebrations and flybys to record the demise of the venerable Tornado that ships of the Royal Navy never depart for the breaker’s yard with such, if any, fanfare. ‘You can’t do a fly past in a ship’ seems like an obvious reason but I wondered if there was a more profound reason. Spoiler – there isn’t.
Continue reading “Plane Sailing”Recently, HMS Queen Elizabeth posted the latest in a long line of epic photos from her recent exploits. The one in question was of her and her task group all steaming along in perfect formation or ‘the photex’ as it’s known.
Continue reading “A Picture Paints a Thousand Words”HMS Queen Elizabeth delayed sailing today due to strong easterly winds in what is a good example of risk-vs-operational imperative decision making. The following short read is a counter to the resulting ‘what if we had to go to war and it was windy’ commentary.
Continue reading “Mind the gap”It was recently announced by the Royal Navy that the internationally respected position of Flag Officer Sea Training (FOST) is to be discontinued. The new position is one rank lower (Commodore) and in an intelligent bit of branding, to be called Commander Fleet Operational Sea Training. So still FOST, basically.
The response to this across the twittersphere was classically resigned. “It doesn’t matter” and “it’s happened before and the sky didn’t fall in” being typical.
I wonder though. Does rank dilution matter or not?
To answer this, I’m going to start with a base assumption:
The more senior the person is in a position the more experience they have and, based on the selection requirements for higher rank, the more capable they will be.
Now, I will concede that this is quite an assumption, especially the second half. We have all seen junior officers who knock spots off their superiors. Conversely there have been 2*s over the years whose thick stripe has felt like a tailoring error (no disrespect). But on average, assuming a functioning promotion system and when reviewed across branches, ranks and years, this assumption must be true.
In which case, the only reason rank dilution wouldn’t matter was if the wrong level was set in the first place or had become wrong over time.
Looking at the table below, there are certainly a number of positions that fall into that second category. A 4* Second Sea Lord and Commander in Chief Fleet being two good examples. In fact, size and shape of the top of the pyramid feels about right just now but beneath that there has been significant rank dilution over the years. Here are some of the ones I can remember (since 1990) – I am sure there are many others:
| Position | Was | Now | Date | Remarks |
| Fleet Commander | 4* | 3* | 2012 | Was Commander In Chief |
| Second Sea Lord | 4* | 3* | 2005 | |
| Flag Officer Scotland | 3* | 2* | c. 1996 | |
| Commandant General Royal Marines | 3* | 2* | 1998 |
| Position | Was | Now | Date | Remarks |
| Training establishment captains | Scale A Captain** | 1* now 1st/2nd tour Captain | 1998 | Dartmouth, Raleigh, Collingwood, Sultan |
| Admiralty Interview Board | 1* | Commander | u/k |
| Position | Was | Now | Date | Remarks |
| Flag Officer Sea Training | 2* | 1* | 2000 | Now Commander Fleet Operational Sea Training |
| Flag Officer Flotillas | 3 x 2* | 1 x 1* and 2 x Captain | c. 1995 | Devflot demoted to Captain ‘20 |
| Position | Was | Now | Date | Remarks |
| Aircraft carrier Captain | Scale A Captain | 1st/2nd tour Captain | 2020 | Was always second sea command as a Captain |
| P2000 Captain | Senior Lt/Lt Cdr | Second tour Lt | c. 2000 |
| Position | Was | Now | Date | Remarks |
| Chief of Defence Staff | 5* | 4* | 1997 | |
| Director Defence Medical Services | 3* | 2* | 1990s | |
| Director Plans | 1* (per service) | Single 1* | 2010s |
| Position | Was | Now | Date | Remarks |
| CINC Naval Home Command | 4* | N/A | Discontinued | |
| Deputy Fleet Commander | 3* | N/A | Discontinued |
| Position | Was | Now | Date | Remarks |
| Flag Officer Submarines | 3* | 2* | There are quite a few in this category that have been either discontinued or double/treble hatted | |
| Flag Officer Naval Aviation | 2* | 2* | There are quite a few in this category that have been either discontinued or double/treble hatted |
Other than having a job set at a certain level to optimise output, there are other factors that determine the rank of a position:
All of these are fluid and it is therefore right that the associated ranks are periodically reviewed.
The first problem is that this is rarely the driver for change. Instead, it is more usually a desire to save money, either to pay for something else or to ingratiate individuals or ‘the system’ to the MoD. It often happens prior to a defence review or to bolster an individual’s pitch for promotion.
The second problem is finding evidence that either of these have ever been successful. But, because the initiatives come from the top and are (outwardly) to save money, woe betide anyone who objects – hence the pavlovian insistence that it doesn’t really matter.
This isn’t supposed to be an inter-service dig, and I have no evidence to support it, but the Army does seem to lag when it comes to its own dilution resulting in some headline differences, the Commandant of Sandhurst still being a 2* whilst the head of Dartmouth is ‘just’ a Captain perhaps being the most obvious.
Inter service parity is important here especially as overall numbers shrink and competition for the key Joint jobs becomes ever more fierce. Falling in line with the Army’s use of the Brigadier was one of the reasons the Navy substantiated the rank of Commodore in 1997. Add the dilution going on just now to the 20year cycle that these things seem to follow then add a splash of “nothing is sacred right now” and I’ll put a small wager that Commodore will be abandoned again in the next few years. This will be badged as a way of saving money but in reality will just create chaos at Joint selection boards.
In sum, will the Navy be thanked for its current diluting (and culling) at the next Defence Review? I doubt it. Meanwhile, the axe continues to fall and everybody says it’s fine.
I’ll finish with a thought experiment. If one extrapolates the argument that rank dilution doesn’t really matter, why not have all frigates, destroyers and submarines commanded by Lieutenant Commanders?
Postscript. There is a different-but-linked debate to be had about the overall number of ranks (often reckoned to be too high). This is nicely captured in this Wavell Room article written in 2018.
Many of a Hunt Class’s mine-hunter’s hull-design characteristics are based on the requirement for it to accurately hold position at sea whilst prosecuting mines. Relatively large propellers & rudders, a bow-thruster, a rounded hull form & shallow draft all assist with this. These same characteristics also mean that it can ‘walk’ sideways during berthing and unberthing. A neat trick that can get you in and out of tight spots when required.
The principle of walking is simple, the execution, sometimes less so. In this instance you need to exit to the West and therefore:
1. Set bow-thruster to port (full)
2. Use a combination of main engines and rudders to provide counter-torque:
2a. Port ME ahead (slow)
2b. Stbd ME astern (half-ish)
2c. Rudders to stbd (xx degrees)
3. Get all this in balance and the ship should walk laterally to port.
4. Never forget ceremonial…
That’s the theory. As with everything maritime, it’s never quite that simple:
1. Because everything is in balance, if something changes (wind/tide/system fail) you can quickly run out of escape options.
2. You need to set up ‘the balance’ from the start of the manoeuvre. For example, the fwd engine/prop (2a) bites like your car with no synchromesh – if that happens too early, you’ll surge forward (bad). Timing is key.
3. The Hunt’s high sides, shallow displacement and rounded hull make them excellent sailing vessels. Any more than c.8kts of wind and your set up will need to be adjusted.
4. Compared to normal berthing/unberthing, ‘walking’ is quite slow.
But if you get it just right; everything nicely balanced, no fwd or aft movement (at all for bonus points!) and with precision control of the ships head using just the rudder, then you can get in and out of tight spaces, exit in a smart and seamanlike manner and show general cunning to your destroyer mates as they wait for yet another tug.
Footnote: a Sandown Class mine hunter can do all this at the touch of a button which is why they’re not to be trusted.
Second footnote: these are the kind of ship-handling skills that an automated mine-hunting force will not provide the commanders of tomorrow.
Commander Tom Sharpe OBE (Retd) was assigned to three Hunt Class mine sweepers in his career; HMS Chiddingfold as a Young Officer, HMS Brocklesby as a Junior Watchkeeping Officer and HMS Dulverton as the Captain (on Northern Ireland duties).
Tom Sharpe OBE